OUR 



MILITARY EXPERIENCE 



AND 



WHAT IT SUGGESTS. 



' ' To what purpose are the qualifications for arms without discipline 
to render them efficient ?" — Lord Bacon. 



BALTIMORE: 
CUSHINGS & BAILEY. 

1863. 



r 305 









OUR MILITARY EXPERIENCE 

AND 

WHAT IT SUGGESTS. 



That the course of the war thus far has not been very 
flattering to our arms, must he admitted. A country of 
eight millions of white inhabitants, has, as yet successfully 
resisted the twenty millions of the Northern and Border 
States. Nothing is to be gained by deceiving ourselves 
in these matters. The skilful surgeon liiakes a careful 
examination of the wounded patient he -would benefit, 
though the process be a painful one. 

On several occasions our arms have met with decided and 
universally admitted reverses. Even when we have claimed 
victories, they have usually been of rather an equivocal kind. 
After Antietam, the enemy left Maryland as it were at his 
leisure, and not so much because we whipped him as because 
he failed to whip us, and it was necessary for him to have 
done this, if he wished to remain north of the Potomac. At 
Shiloh our troops were driven to their gunboats on the first 
day, and on the second, the enemy were driven back but a 
short distance by the fresh reinforcements under Buel. 
Perryville, despite newspaper exaggerations always read to 
us more like a defeat than a victory, and we cannot see that 
we had much cause to boast about Murfreesborough. From 
our own accounts of that battle, G-eneral McCook was badly 
whipped and driven back the first day : on the next, there 
was little or no fighting ; on the third day the enemy at- 
1 



tempted to drive us further, and having failed, they retired 
in the night. Bragg claims to have taken back with him 
several thousand prisoners, two hundred wagons, thirty-two 
cannon and a great number of small arms. 

SOUTHEKN MILITAEY POLICY. 

Do we know any reasons why the South, as a military 
power, should have been comparatively more successful than 
ourselves ^ They have doubtless a great advantage m the 
fact that they are fighting on the defensive, on their own 
soil and surrounded by a friendly population, but besides 
these, there are other very important causes m operation. 

Their military organization seems to approach more nearly 
the character of a regular army than our own. Much has 
been said about the folly of raising soldiers by draft and con- 
scription, but we believe this has for the most part been but 
buncombe and bombast. An army of conscripts implies a 
strong military power in the Government which can not 
only make the citizen a soldier, but will subject him to such 
discipline as will make him a good one. For carrying out 
a thorough military system the South has shown peculiar 
sagacity in the selection of its leader. He was educated to 
the profession of arms, served in the field, and for four years 
filled the office of Secretary of War. As a politician it was 
not his style to give vent to those clap-trap speeches to the 
preiudice of the military profession, and a permanent regular 
organization, which for many years past have been so common 
in the mouths of demagogues and fourth of July orators 

When Secretary of War he advocated the increase ol the 
pay of the army, the addition of several new regiments, and 
the concentration of troops in large garrisons for purposes 
of instruction. He showed his confidence in Military men 
over mere partizans and spoils seekers by advocating the 
Military Superintendency of the armories, the Military con- 
trol of the Indians, and consequent abolition of many enor- 
mous partizan abuses in the Indian Department, and in the 
appointment of an army officer to the supervision of the cap- 
ital extension, and other Public Works, despite the clamors 
of disappointed party jobbers and would-be contractors. 



When four new regiments were raised, all the field officers 
save one, and the ranking half of the Captains and Lieu- 
tenants were promoted from the old army in accordance with 
his wishes as Secretary of War. When he accepted the 
leadership of the rebellion, he announced that all officers of 
the regular army who would enter the Confederate service, no 
matter from what section of the country they might come, 
should receive equal or higher rank than they were then 
holding, and the same or greater pay — commissions too were 
sent to the graduates of the Military schools of the South 
all over the world wherever they could be found. The estab- 
lishment of these Military schools shows that the South as 
a people appreciated Military knowledge ; and the profession 
of arms has always been more popular among them than at 
the North. When the war broke out, it found most of our 
prominent generals who were Military graduates, in civil 
life, as McClellan, Rosecrans, Halleck, Burnside, Hooker, 
Sherman, Curtis, and others. It found however, Lee, the two 
Johnstons, Beauregard, Longstreet, Van Dorn, Huger and 
other prominent Southern officers still in the army. The 
governing classes of the South were fully capable of appre- 
ciating what was necessary to render an army effective, and 
when they committed their section to rebellion, and found 
that war was to be the result^ they bent every energy to 
perfect their Military system by which alone they could hope 
for success. They knew that popular enthusiasm alone could 
not be relied on to keep up armies when the miseries of war 
had been long and extensively experienced, and they placed 
their chief reliance upon the force of authority and discipline. 
From all that we have learned of their armies, we have 
reason to believe they are subjected to a discipline very much 
more rigid than our own. It has been a common report that 
their officers do not hesitate to shoot down their men on the 
field for the slightest wavering or disobedience of orders, and 
they have a precedent for this in the orders of Washington 
in our revolutionary war. We have read frequently of some 
of their men having been shot or hung, and a statement has 
been going the rounds of our papers that several of their 
officers had been reduced to the ranks, because of unauthor- 



ized absence from their duties. I have been told the following 
by a person who professes to have positive knowledge of the 
facts. A soldier of the rebel army applied to his General 
for his discharge having received a certificate from his Sur- 
geon and Captain that he was ruptured and unfit for Military 
duty ; the General nevertheless ordered him to go to duty 
which he refused to do, and before twelve o'clock next day he 
IV as shot. 

NORTHERN MILITARY POLICY. 

In the North we have had an army of more than a million 
of men since the war begun, and in spite of very consider- 
able insubordination and occasional mutiny, it is probable 
that not more than half a dozen military executions have 
thus far taken place. All of us recollect how in the early 
stages of the war certain regiments had to be coerced into 
obedience by a regular battery and squadron of cavalry, and 
how the major part of another regiment (now out of service) 
continued its retreat from Bull Run all the way to New 
York, and there held an indignation meeting, declaring 
that their disgust for the service had proceeded from the 
fact that their Colonel had told them that the Zoo Zoo drill 
was played out ; in other words, that standing on their heads 
and turning cart ivheels might all be very fine for circus 
actors, but was not exactly the drill for soldiers. Only the 
other day we read of half a regiment of cavalry refusing to 
go into action for no other reason, so far as we have yet 
heard, than because they did not ivant to. 

All of our public measures have been very considerably in- 
fluenced, either directly or remotely, by a class of people 
who in times past have been in the habit of sneering at the 
military profession, who affected to despise its ranks and 
grades and inequalities, and who looked upon a sixth ward 
politician as of more consideration than the most accom- 
plished officer. Even now, and on the floor of the Senate 
are heard expressions of contempt towards the Military 
school of the nation. 



WEST POINT. 

One gentleman opposed tlie academy because of its exclu- 
siveness, yet the members of Congress are the parties who 
make the appointments. Of course it is exclusive, for if it can 
but educate three hundreds youths at a time, some two or three 
millions or more must necessarily be kept out ; on the same 
principle these gentlemen would most likely think Congress 
an exclusive body, particularly if they happened to be among 
the outs instead of the ins. We commend them to study 
the philosophy of a remark attributed to the President in 
reference to an appointment to office he was about to make — 
'' that when two men wanted to ride the same horse one must 
get behind." One Senator thought that West Point was 
the cause of the rebellion, the politicians according to him 
could have had but little to do with it. Could the Senator 
have thought that the country could be deceived by such a 
statement as this ? What candid man believes that seces- 
sion would ever have been inaugurated by the officers of the 
Army ? Men from all sections of the country, for the most 
part bound together by the memories of a common Alma 
Mater, partaking of a common exile upon our wild Indian 
frontiers where it was their custom to wile away many an 
hour in talking over the scenes of their West Point home, 
bound together by the ties of the regiment and the mess, 
and actuated by the same Esprit du Corps, the officers of 
the Army were eminently a conservative and national body 
of men. These men were believers in law, authority and 
discipline, and in supporting the dignity and power of the 
General Government, and no class of men in our country 
were more thoroughly disgusted with the contempt con- 
stantly oiFered the Federal Government by demagogues, and 
spoils hunters, Mormons, squatters, whiskey sellers, " et id 
omne genus." 

As a class I believe I am right in saying of them that 
they did not sympathize with the doctrines of universal suf- 
frage, rotation in office, frequent elections for all kinds of 
officers, and the many other ultra democratic, radical and 
destructis^e political principles whicli have gained a baleful 



ascendancy among the people and in the policy of the 
country, since the good old conservative party of Washing- 
ton, Hamilton, Adams, Jay and Marshall was destroyed. 

It is to the demagogues who have brought about this state 
of things, and not to our conservative little army that this 
rebellion is more properly attributable, and indeed I have 
sometimes thought that if the ''Peace Convention" had 
been composed of Army officers alone they would all still 
be serving under the same old flag of a happy and undivided 
country, instead of meeting each other in deadly conflict. 

The officers of our army too, living as they did in isolated 
garrisons upon the frontiers, have been very extensively 
bound together by marriage connexions, and no class of our 
community has been so great a sufferer by this terrible war 
which has severed their dearest ties and rushed them sword 
in hand against each other foremost in the fight on every 
battle field. 

Of the general officers who have thus far fallen in this 
war for the Union^ probably two-thirds, (we write from 
memory,) were of the old regular army. We recall the 
names of Lyon, Sill, Terrell, Williams, Stevens, Eeno, 
Mansfield, Bayard, Kearney and Kichardson, all of whom 
belonged to the old army, and except tlie last two were 
graduates of West Point. 

I have no apology to off"er for those officers who have 
deserted their colors, and to attempt to do so would be a 
base reflection upon the many brave and loyal Southerners 
who are still true, and who are among the very best officers 
in our army. But I do say that the Southern officers_, as a 
body, left our army with deep sorrow that the politicians of 
the country had made it in their opinion necessary for them 
to do so^ and very generally "when parting from their com- 
rades they declared that they resigned because they could 
not fight against their brothers, but would never take up 
arms against the Old Flag. It is a melancholy fact however 
that when they went home they did not long resist the pres- 
sure and remain idle amid such a contest, and though we 
must acquit West Point of inaugurating, advising or de- 
siring tliis rebellion, we believe it would have been com- 



7 

paratively but a weak affair without the military genius and 
influence of her Southern sons. 

We now recur to the West Point debate in the Senate. 

One military Senator thought that not a ray of genius had 
emanated from a graduate during the war, and another said 
that West Point had been a positive obstruction to our armies, 
probably referring to Davis, Lee, Johnston, Jackson, Beaui^e- 
gard, Bragg, Longstreet, Van Born, the Hills, &c. 

Other members based their opposition on the grounds that 
their constituents did not like the institution, which is 
usually a potent argument with an M. C. Unfortunately 
we fear this levelling disposition is but too common among 
constituents. ''What right has them stuck up Jones's to 
hev their boy Tom edikated by Uncle Sam, when I hev to 
pay old Ichabod Crane five dollars a quarter for the schoolin 
of my four boys. That West Pint is a aristocratick insti- 
tushun and i'll write to the members from this deestrick and 
hev it busted up right away." 

In the French revolution it was regarded by the radicals 
a crime against the state to have had a grandfather, and 
that class of thinkers in these days, seem to look upon mili- 
tary education in the same light. So great is their love for 
equality (which in reality only exists in the purely abstract 
science of mathematics) and so great is their hatred to rank 
and grades that we would scarcely be surprised to hear from 
them a proposition to do away with officers altogether. 

But fortunately for the country, we have some men in 
position, who, like Senator Nesmyth, can see that education 
in any business is certainly worth something, and that cities 
now-a-days are not to be taken by the '■^blowing of horns," 
a practice which we think by this time ought to have been 
^'played out." The fact is, that at the South, West Point, 
with Davis for a leader, controls the politicians, but in the 
North, the reverse is very near the truth. 

So far as the charge of exciting jealousies in the army is 
concerned. West Point would confidently submit her cause 
to the verdict of the officers of the old army who were ap- 
pointed from civil life. 



8 

In a former article, (in the Baltimore American,) we have 
considered the evil system which has been followed in officer- 
ing regiments, and by which so many incompetent persons 
obtained commissions. We will quote the article. 

OFFICEES. 

'' I saw it stated in Saturday's paper, that General 

had ordered that any officer who offered his resignation, 
should be dishonorably dismissed the service. I know not 
if this be so, but I believe the general fact is true, that 
during the war there has been much difficulty experienced 
in getting resignations accepted. A Surgeon told me that 
he knew an officer who behaved in a disgraceful manner 
during an action^ and that after it was over, he himself told 
the officer to his face, that he was a coward, although he did 
not prefer charges against him. The officer immediately 
handed in his resignation but it was weeks before it was 
accepted and his place supplied with a better man. When 
a new regiment goes into action, it is not unlikely that 
some of its officers may become convinced of the fact that 
war is not their forte, and before another comes off, may 
hand in their resignations, and certainly it seems the true 
policy to accept them at once. Cases undoubtedly do occur, 
when resignations should not be accepted, and officers should 
be dishonorably dismissed the service, but if it be understood 
that all who oifer their resignations are to be treated in this 
way, it will have the effect of keeping men in service who 
are sensible of their own unfitness for the positions they 
occupy. 

Now what can we expect of an army if many of its offi- 
cers are serving as such under compulsion. They are to be 
the leaders, yea, the despotic leaders of their men if suc- 
cess is to be attained, for despite their inferiority in numbers, 
the influence of the officers upon military results in propor- 
tion to that of the men, is at least as one hundred to one. 
If men have the right kind of officers they can be made to 
go wherever their officers will go, and stay wherever and as 
long as they will stay. With such officers, men soon learn 
that obedience is less dan<>:erous than is the coutrarv. 



9 

The grand mistake made by the North in this war has 
been in ignoring the great relative importance of the officers 
in military organizations, and in adopting a vicious method 
of officering regiments. 

The usual system has been that a State Governor has 
given some political adherent the privilege of raising a reg- 
iment, and has probably appointed also the other field officers. 
These have made it known that whoever would bring them 
a certain number of men, should have a Captain's commis- 
sion, and that for some smaller number a Lieutenant's com- 
mission would be given. Now, it is evident, that under 
such a system, the men who have " popularity " enough to 
raise a company will frequently be about the worst men for 
officers. Indeed it is questionable whether it would not be 
nearer the truth to say, that the fact of a man's " popu- 
larity " in such cases is rather a proof of unfitness than 
otherwise. And when good men do obtain company com- 
missions through the favor, as it were, of their men, this 
fact itself must materially interfere with military discipline. 

Brigade Surgeons have told me that even the appointing of 
medical officers to regiments from their own neighborhoods 
was attended with many serious evils. In the afiairs of civil 
life, the mechanic who hopes to succeed, will not permit 
familiarities towards his foreman or boss, or on the part of 
his journeymen and apprentices. 

The fact of it is, the spirit of the North has been too 
democratic in its tendencies to establish a thorough military 
system. It has been disposed to flatter the many, and ex- 
hibit a jealousy towards the few in authority, it listens too 
readily to complaints of inferiors against their superiors, 
and its presumptions are always in favor of the governed 
against the governors. This spirit is necessarily antago- 
nistic to a system whose corner stone is implicit obedience to 
superior authority, even at the risk of life itself. Indeed 
many of the men and journals that are fierce for this war, 
have been noted in time past for denouncing military estab- 
lishments, as an useless expense, military science as a hum- 
bus;, and militarv men as mercenaries and coxcombs. In 
2 



10 

their view, patriotism was the only defence the country 
would ever require ; yet in this war, the patriotism of the 
volunteer has heen stimulated by double the pay that was 
given to the old mercenaries. It may be said that it is 
necessary to oflScer our armies in the manner alluded to, in 
order to induce the men to volunteer. Better then raise the 
men by ''draft;" and it is not so ''certain, whether from the 
first this would not have been the best way of raising an 
army, and whether such men with good officers, would not 
prove more efficient than those who carry with them into 
the ranks the idea that military service is, on their part, 
only a voluntary affair." 

As bearing upon some of the views expressed in the above 
article, we will merely allude here in passing to the leniency 
which our people have regarded and unfortunately still 
regard the high military crime of desertion. 

STATE QUOTAS. 

Having considered some of the evils by which regiments 
have been officered, we may here say a few words as to the 
way in which the States have recently been furnishing men. 

To avoid the draft, large bounties were offered, and such 
ruinous facilities given to enlistment, that as a consequence, 
our hospitals are crowded with broken down men, who have 
scarcely seen any service, who only entered and drew their 
bounties a few months ago, and who ought never to have 
been enlisted at all. In some cases, the parties who induced 
unsuitable men to enlist, are now busy in endeavoring to 
procure their discharge, and we have no doubt cases could 
be found where parties have enlisted two or three times, and 
drawn several bounties, who have never heard the gun of an 
enemy. 

OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. 

Another evil of our military system is, that of outside 
interference. Members of Congress, and politicians in their 
public and private capacity are busy looking after the inter- 
ests of their constituents, who are privates, officers, sutlers 
or contractors in the army. Self-constituted commissions 



11 

and committees of all kinds, and both sexes, are busy at 
work in military affairs, sometimes no doubt for good, but 
we candidly believe in the main for evil. Much of the good 
too has only been apparent, and has been done by outsiders, 
not so much because the government machinery was inade- 
quate, but because the people clamored for their right to 
interfere, and the government organization had to yield. 

Another class that has had considerable influence, both 
immediate and remote, upon our affairs, comprise the vision- 
aries and philanthropists, who are unfit to be trusted with any 
practical common sense business, who believe in vegetable 
diet, Thomsonianism, &c. and who meet together seriously 
for the purpose of doing a great deal of good, by changing 
women into men, and abolishing the laws of nature in va- 
rious other respects. From such influences we could derive 
no benefit in carrying on the eminently practical business of 
war. 

We believe many soldiers have been made homesick, and 
disgusted with the service by the officiousness of State 
agents and rose-water philanthropists. 

VOLUNTEERS, NOT ALWAYS VOLUNTEERS. 

It is time now for the Union party to take a practical 
view of affairs, and to discard the follies which political 
stump orators have been teaching them for so many years. 
While they give all honor to those who have entered our 
army from patriotic motives, they ought to see the neces- 
sity of keeping it up and making it efficient. Every 
paper startles us with statements as to the great numbers of 
officers and men absent from their regiments without leave. 
It is probably no exaggeration to say that if to-morrow 
every man of our army (a voluntary one though it be) 
were permitted to do as he pleased, not fifty thousand would 
be present at roll call twenty-four hours afterwards. Not 
that so many, perhaps, as this implies, would seek to absent 
themselves permanently, but they would not be on hand or 
available. Practically then, even a voluntary army must be 
kept together by discipline and compulsion. 



12 



UNION SENTIMENT OF THE SOUTH. 

But few now, I suppose, look for much material support 
frora the Union sentiment of the South, No douht at the 
commencement of our troubles there was a large Union 
party there, hut many of them are now in the Army, and 
have lost fathers, sons and brothers in the war. They 
may have been compelled to enter the service, but soldiers 
cannot long fight for a cause without wishing it to be suc- 
cessful, and will readily forgive any amount of discijDline on 
the part of their officers, provided they but lead them to 
victory. Military success then is what we want^ and the 
negro question, habeas corpus question, and indeed all others 
should be looked upon as but secondary. Now, a military 
force to be thoroughly efficient, particularly for conquest or 
invasion, must be subjected to the stern discipline of regular 
troops. The better to illustrate many of the points discussed 
in this article, we will take a short glance at our country's 
wars, beginning with the Revolution. 

In doing this it has not been our desire to draw invidious 
comparisons ; but so much has been written and said on 
these subjects for mere "buncombe," that we believe a little 
wholesome truth is justified and demanded by the occasion. 

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. 

During the Revolution, Washington wrote volumes to 
Congress on the necessity of an adequate regular military 
establishment, and the inefficiency of other kinds of troops. 
We quote a few extracts from Sparks' "Life of Washing- 
ton." Speaking of the militia, the General says, "Great 
numbers of them have gone off, in some instances, almost 
by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies at a 
time. With the deepest concern I am obliged to confess my 
want of confidence in the generality of the troops. Men 
who have been free and subject to no control, cannot be 
reduced to order in an instant." Again, he says, "it is not 
easy to be conceived, except by those who are witnesses to 
it, what an additional waste and consumption of every 



13 

thing, and consequently what an increase of expense results 
from#laxness of discipline in the army; and where the 
officers think they are doing the public a favor hy holding 
their commissions, and the men are constantly fluctuating, 
it is impossible to maintain discipline." 

Moved by his (Washington's) representations and appeals 
as well as by their own sense of the necessity of the case, 
Congress determined to reorganize the army on a plan con- 
formable in its essential features to the suggestions of the 
Commander-in-Chief, they who for a long time cherished a 
lingering hope of reconciliation, were at length convinced that 
the struggle would not soon terminate, and that it must be met 
by all the means which the wisdom, patriotism and resources 
of the country could supply. To the 7-esolute and discerning, 
this had been obvious from the moment the sword was drawn. 
The events of a year had impressed it on the minds of all. 

The new army was to consist of Thus matured, the 

plan was sent to the Commander-in-Chief — but General 
Washington perceived defects in the scheme which he feared 
would retard, if not defeat its operations. The pay of the 
officers had not been increased, and he was persuaded that 
officers of character could not be induced to retain their com- 
mission on the old pay, (what mercenaries were these revolu- 
tionary officers, our sentimental radicals would say.) The 
mode of appointing them was defective, it being left to the 
State governments, which would act slowly without adequate 
knowledge, and often under influences not salutary to the 
interest of the army. ****** ^^ length, also 
the States being negligent and tardy in the providing for the 
appointment of officers. Congress authorized General Wash- 
ington to fill up the vacancies. 

"By a formal resolve, he was authorized to displace and 
appoint all officers under the rank of Brigadiers, and to fill 
up vacancies in every part of the arm3^ 

"Some of the States had neglected to complete their ap- 
pointments, and generally, these were made with so little 
judgment, and with such a disregard of military rules that 
officers icitliout ivorth or experience had been put over the heads 



14 

of tJiose who had been accustomed to service, and had given 
proofs of their valor and ability. By his power to displace 
and fill up vacancies, Washington rectified these errors as 
far as prudence would permit — he took care to promote 
meritorious officers who had been overlooked by the State." 

Our three most memorable and important successes in the 
revolution, the capture of Burgoyne, the campaign of the 
Jerseys and the capture of Cornwallis, were almost exclu- 
sively attributable in the first two instances, to what were 
called the "" Continental troops " or, " troops of the line " 
and in the last case to these troops and the French com- 
bined. 

Crayden, an officer in the Continental Army says, "yet 
in the day of trial from whatever cause it proceeded, the 
fate of the country and its liberties was always committed to 
a handful of mercenaries the very things which were the 
eternal theme of our scor?i and contempt." We have seen 
with what extraordinary authority Washington was invested 
by Congress in the matter of officering his army ; and the 
policy which he sought to pursue in its exercise may be 
judged from the following extract from a letter which he 
wrote to Colonel Baylor, who was to command a regiment of 
light-horse; he says "as nothing contributes so much to the 
constitution of a good regiment as a good corps of officers 
and no method is so likely to obtain tliese as leaving the 
choice in a great measure to the gentleman who is to reap 
the honors, or share the disgrace of their behavior, I 
shall vest you with the power of nominating the officers of 
your regiment, except the field officers, claiming to myself 
a negative upon a part or a whole, if I have reason to sus- 
pect an improper choice. I earnestly recommend to you to 
be circumspect in your choice of officers. Take none but 
gentlemen; let no local attachments influence you; do not 
suffer your good nature when an application is made to say 
"yes," when you ought to say "no." Eemember that it 
is a public not a private cause that is to be injured or bene- 
fitted by your choice. Recollect also^ that no instance has 
yet happened of good or bad behavior in a corps in our service 
that has not originated with the officers." 



15 

Take none but gentlemen, says Washington, what an una- 
vailajble old fogy would he have been for public office in the 
times of the ''Latter-day Saints." 

"As bearing upon the subject of 'officers' as well as dis- 
cipline, we quote from 'Irving.' 'There is a great overturn- 
ing in the camp as to order and regularity,' (writes the 
military chaplain,) 'new lords, new laws. The Grenerals 
Washington and Lee are upon the lines every day * * * The 
strictest government is taking place, and great distinction is 
made between officers and soldiers. Every one is made to 
hnow Ms place and keep it, or be tied up and receive thirty or 
forty lashes, according to his crime." 

The following extract from a letter of Washington in 
Sparks' life shows his policy towards mutineers. 

"The fatal tendency of that spirit which has shown itself 
in the Pennsylvania and Jersey lines, and which derived so 
much encouragement from impunity in the case of the former, 
determined me at all events to pursue a different conduct with 
respect to the latter. For this purpose, I detached a body of 
troops under Major General Howe with orders to compel the 
mutineers to unconditional submission, and execute on the 
spot a few of the principal incendiaries. This has been effected 
this morning, and we have reason to believe the mutinous 
disposition of the troops is now completely subdued and 
succeeded by genuine penitence." 

The "continental" troops were for the most part originally 
raised only for the war, but Washington was not insensible 
of the superiority and necessity of an adequate permanent 
military establishment, and urged the matter upon Congress. 
He says "supported by a prospect of permanent independence 
the officers would be tied to the service, and would submit 
to many momentary privations, and to the inconveniences 
which the situation of public affairs make unavoidable. 
This is exemplified in the Pennsylvania officers, who being 
upon this establishment, are so much interested in the ser- 
vice, that in the course of months there has been only one 
resignation in that line." 

And again he writes, "the next, and I believe the last 



16 

thing I shall have time to touch upon, is our military estab- 
lishment; and here if I thought the conviction of the 
necessity of having a permanent force, had not e'er this 
flashed upon every man's mind, I could write a volume in 
support of the utility of it, for no day or hour arrives unac- 
companied with proof of some loss, some expense, or some 
misfortune, consequent on the want of it. No operation of 
war_, offensive or defensive, can be carried on for any length 
of time without it. No funds are adequate to the supplies 
of a fluctuating army, though it may go under the denomination 
of a regidar one." 

And again we are told, '''an incident is related as having 
occurred while he was in the Convention for forming the 
Constitution, which was probably suggested by his experience 
during the war. A member proposed to introduce a clause 
into the Constitution, limiting a standing army to five 
thousand men. Washington observed he should have no ob- 
jection to such a clause, if it were so amended as to provide 
that no enemy should presume to invade the United States 
with mare than three thousand." 

THE WAE OF 1812. 

In this war though the navy achieved some signal victories, 
the land forces on the whole acquired but little glory. A 
few pages are brightened by the records of Fort Stephenson, 
Lundy's Lane, Bridgewater and Chijjpewa, where regular 
troops and their oflicers. Brown, Scott, Kipley, Towson, 
Jessup and Croghan_, redeemed, to some extent, the disgrace 
which the militia had brought upon our arms. 

Nor should the brave Barney who stood with his marines 
by the bridge at the Bladensburg races be overlooked, nor 
the gallant defenders of Fort McHenry. Even the battle of 
New Orleans which we talk so much about (and which was 
won by a regular officer,) is a most wonderful illustration of 
the daring and steadiness under fire, which masses of men 
may attain by regular training and thorough discipline. 
There the British regulars marched up to breastworks with 
the flints knocked from their muskets ; on arriving at the 



17 

ditch, it was found that through some mistake, the regiments 
that had charge of the fascines and ladders had not come up, 
and the troops stood there under a deadly fire, which they 
could not return until ordered to retire, after some fourteen 
hundred men and three commanding Grenerals had been 
killed or wounded. To the bungling of the British Generals 
and their contempt of their enemy, is mainly attributable 
their defeat at New Orleans. 

THE MEXICAN WAR. 

In the Mexican war we all remember what troops fought 
Palo Alto and Besaca — what composed Worth's and Twiggs' 
divisions which did most of the fighting on the lower line, 
and what was the character of Ringgold's, Bragg's, Dun- 
can's and Sherman's batteries. 

The following tabular statement of the killed and wound- 
ed in the Mexican war, taken from official sources will best 
illustrate this part of the subject. 





Mean 
Strength. 


Killed and Mor- 
tally wounded. 


Wounded not 
Mortally. 




Officers 


Men. 


Officers. 


Men. 


Old Regular Force, 


15,73t) 
11,186 
73,532 


63 
10 
47 


729 
133 

517 


118 
36 

129 


1685 


Additional Regulars (for the War,) 
Volunteers, 


236 
1189 



It will thus be seen that the absolute loss in battle by the 
old army numbering less than sixteen thousand men, ex- 
ceeded that of the "war regulars" and volunteers together, 
and which amounted to about eighty-five thousand men. 

Almost one-half of the whole loss of the volunteers was 
in the battle of "Buena Vista," where there were no regu- 
lar troops, save a few batteries, and companies of dragoons; 
a battle that was more nearly lost than any that was fought 
in Mexico, yet saved principally by the stubborn determina- 
tion of the veteran general in command, and the cool steadi- 
ness of the regular artillery. 

THE PRESENT WAR. 

We suspect there are persons who will almost be sur- 
prised to hear that at present we have any regular army at 



18 

all, so much have they read in long newspaper letters of the 
exploits of the bloody 901st, or gallant 900th, or the Fre- 
mont Body Guard. But letter-writing for newspapers is 
not the forte of regular soldiers, and has always heen dis- 
couraged in well disciplined armies. At Big Bethel and the 
first Bull Kun fights there were a few regular troops en- 
gaged, and from all accounts they did fully as well as could 
he expected from so small a number. In the first of these 
fights Greble, and in the latter, Tillinghast was killed. 

Immediately after the Bull Run panic, the few ''regulars" 
about the Capital were used to exercise a wholesome coer- 
cive power over certain highly patriotic, but rather muti- 
nous volunteer regiments. On the Peninsula all the regu- 
lars, except a few batteries, were in the reserve, of which 
they constituted the greater portion. In the battle of 
Gaines' Mills, they nobly maintained their part of the line, 
but it was at Malvern where these troops, particularly the 
artillery, best showed their true metal. 

There was a brigade of regulars in the battle of Murfrees- 
borough, under the command of General Eousseau, himself 
a volunteer. As to their conduct in that fight, we extract 
the following from one of the papers of the day. 

"In the report of the battle — lasting five days — General 
Rousseau uses the following language in regard to the 
brigade. 

"The brigade of the United States Infantry, Lieut. Col. 
M. Shepherd commanding, was on the extreme right ; on 
that body of brave men, the shock of battle fell heaviest, 
and its loss was most severe. 

"Nearly one-half of the command fell, killed or wounded; 
but it stood up to the work and bravely breasted the storm ; 
and, though Major King, commanding the Fifteenth, and 
Major Slemmer, (old Pickens) of the Sixteenth, fell severely 
wounded, and Maj. Carpenter, commanding the Nineteenth, 
fell dead in the last charge, together with many other brave 
officers and men ; the brigade did not falter for a moment. 
These three battalions were a part of my old Fourth, at the 
battle of Shiloli. 



19 

''The Eighteenth Infantry, Majors Townsend and Caldwell 
commanding, were new troops to me; but I am proud to 
say we know each other now. If I could I would promote 
every officer, and several non-commissioned officers and pri- 
vates of this brigade of regulars for gallantry and good ser- 
vice in this terrific battle. I make no distinction between 
these troops and my brave volunteer regiments ; for in my 
judgment there were never better troops than those regi- 
ments in the world ; but the troops of the line were soldiers 
by profession, and, with a view to the future, I feel it my 
duty to say what I have of them. The brigade was admi- 
rably and skilfully handled by Lieut. Colonel Sheplierd. — 
This is high praise to come from such a man as General 
Rousseau. He is no untried holiday soldier. He is emphat- 
ically the fighting general, and qualities which elicit such 
praise as this from him must be of very high order. 

"The country will not fail to remember his conduct at the 
fight at Chaplin Hills and Shiloh, and in the semi-official ac- 
count of this fight [Murfreesborough] it is said of him — 'It 
was again the fortune of General Rousseau with his division 
to change the fortunes of the day. The right wing of our 
army, under command of Major Gen. McCook, had been 
completely overwhelmed and driven from its position, by 
the overwhelming masses of the enemy, and Gen. Rousseau, 
with his division, with the brigade of regulars on the right, 
was ordered to move into position to check the victorious 
and pursuing enemy; and well he performed the task.' — 
His message to General Rosecrans, in the hottest of the 
fight is characteristic of the man : ' Tell the general that I 
shall stay here — right here.' And he did stay. 

"The regular brigade suffered severely. Of the officers, 
twenty-six were killed or wounded, and of the enlisted men 
six hundred and eleven." 

In another part of this article it is stated that ShejDherd's 
brigade consisted of seventy officers and fourteen hundred 
men. 

An officer who has been serving with a regular regiment 
in the war, informs me that it has thus far lost in killed 



20 

and wounded, seven-eighths of all the officers who have 
been on duty with it. 

In a preceding part of this article we have already shown 
that the greater part of our general officers who have thus 
far been killed in battle were from the old army, so that the 
complaints so often made of the number of generals who 
have never heard the sound of an enemy's gun, is scarcely 
applicable to that class of officers at least. 

A W AN T. 

Besides a more rigid discipline in our volunteer force, what 
is needed now and always lias been needed, is a larger per- 
manent regular army — an army that will talk but little 
politics, that believes quite as much in discipline as pa- 
triotism, and whose officers are not aspiring to go to 
Congress. 

If we had had one of even fifty thousand men, we doubt 
if this rebellion had ever broken out, and millions of money 
and thousands of lives would have been saved to the coun- 
try. But the great evil of Democracies is the want of fore- 
thought; they are apt to look only at the present, and pro- 
posed measures for the prevention of probable troubles, and 
accompanied with certain and immediate expense, are gener- 
ally unpopular ; yet our national experience has fully dem- 
onstated the fact that a regular establishment is not only 
the most efficient, but by far the most economical kind of 
force. But much difficult}^ has been experienced in keeping 
up our present comparatively small regular army to the 
legalized strength and from obvious causes. In order to 
obtain their quotas the States, counties, and towns have 
offered large bounties for volunteers in addition to the pay 
of the Federal Government, and men therefore naturally 
preferred enlisting as ^^ volunteers/' and thus receiving higher 
pay for their services to the country than regular troops. 
To obviate this result, an order was issued some months ago 
permitting volunteers who desired it to be transferred to the 
regular service ; and as they had already received their boun- 
ties as volunteers, very many of them availed themselves of 
this permission, and thus supplied the regular army with 



21 

much excellent material. This order, however, is no longer 
in operation, having from some cause or other been rescinded 
within a month or so after it was issued. 

At present our regular establishment consists of nineteen 
regiments of infantry, six of cavalry, and five of artillery. 
This force might, we think, be advantageously increased by 
at least seventy additional regiments, making one hundred 
in all — each arm of the service receiving its proportion^e 
increase. With such an addition, it might be desirable to 
dispense with field batteries not in the hands of the regular 
companies. Poor artillery is much more likely to be inju- 
rious than beneficial to an army. By inefiective firing, and 
often at too long a range, they rob their arm of its moral 
efi'ect and excite a contempt for it in the enemy, and when 
charged upon, it too often happens that their guns are aban- 
doned just at the time when they begin to be really efi'ective. 
There is reason to fear that the enemy has already been but 
too liberally supplied with ordnance in this way. 

Whatever may be the termination of this conflict, it is 
more than probable that the country will need an army as 
large as the one proposed. It is the ballast necessary to 
keep the ship of State steady, not only in the storm of the 
revolution, but amid the heavy seas which will follow it. 
If a reduction ever should be deemed advisable, the number 
of men in the regiments might be diminished, and surplus 
officers might be employed with the militia in camps of in- 
struction, and on various other duties under the Federal and 
State Grovernments. They might also be employed to ad- 
vantage by these Governments in various positions of trust, 
not perhaps directly connected with the military service, for 
as disbursing ofiicers, the ofiicers of the regular army have 
always stood proudly pre-eminent on the records for their 
probity and fidelity to the Government. And this is not 
to be wondered at when we consider that they have held 
their ofiices by the tenure of good behaviour, have not been 
influenced by the corrupt principle of '^rotation," nor be- 
longed to a school which regards public ofiice as the 
' ' spoils of faction . " ' 



22 

The great question arises how is this force to be raised 
with the necessary promptness and care ? We think this 
could best be done by converting the requisite number of 
volunteer regiments now in the field into regulars. In our 
several armies, boards of competent officers of the old or the 
additional regular army might be convened to pass upon the 
merits of parties desirous of commissions, and to recom- 
ifiend suitable persons for the various grades. The officers 
of those regiments selected for the regular service Avho could 
not pass the board, must necessarily be displaced; in some 
cases, it might be practicable to assign them to the vacancies 
created by the officers who had passed the board, and where 
this could not be done, they might be ordered to report to 
the Governors of their respective States, who could appoint 
them if it were desirable to fill vacancies in other regiments. 
Provision would also have to be made for those cases where 
an officer promoted to a new regiment would, by joining it, 
leave his old company without any commissioned officer. 
To make the matter more easy of accomplishment, as the 
officers appointed to the converted regiments would all be 
present and ready to go on duty at once, it would not be 
necessary or desirable at first to appoint to these regiments 
their full quota of officers. One field officer to command 
each regiment and two-thirds of the captains and lieutenants, 
so as to give two officers to each company, would at first be 
sufficient. The appointment of only one-half the field offi- 
cers of each grade, would give every regiment a field officer 
to command it, and would besides provide for the promotion 
of those officers of the regular army who now hold field offi- 
cer's commissions in the volunteer forces, and could not leave 
their present commands^ without detriment to the service. 
Whatever additional number of regular general officers 
might be considered necessary, could at any future time be 
appointed, and it is probable that with so large a permanent 
regular army, it would not be considered desirable to in- 
crease in the usual proportion the number of such gen- 
eral officers. Generals to command the new brigades at 
first, might be selected from regular officers holding volun- 
teer generals' rank. 



23 

When this programme was completed, it would leave all 
the generals' commissions, half the colonels, lieutenant col- 
onels and majors, and one-third the captains and lieutenants' 
still to he filled. Promotion, as in the old army, should be 
based on seniority as far as this proposed organization would 
go, i. e. in a regiment, for instance, originally inaugu- 
rated with seven captains and six first and second lieuten- 
ants, promotions to vacancies in these places should be made 
in the ordinary way. The nine hundred original vacancies 
created by this plan, however, should be prizes to be filled 
by extraordinary promotion from the whole army, regular 
and volunteer. A place once filled by extraordinary promo- 
tion should afterwards be open to ordinary promotion only ; 
thus the eighth captaincy in a regiment having once been 
filled by extraordinary promotion, should be afterwards 
filled by promotion in the ordinary way. Officers and sol- 
diers recommended for extraordinary promotion should not 
receive their commissions without having some time or other 
previously passed a board of regular officers. Mere bravery 
in a soldier should not, of itself, be a cause for promotion ; 
for disciplined soldiers are expected to do their duty, and 
are not presumed to be cowards. Officers should be more 
than brave; they should be of such education and habits 
as will give tone to the body to which they belong, and ena- 
ble them to take a respectable position in society. In this 
matter the boards should keep in view the important advice 
of Washington on the same subject, and which has been 
previously quoted. 

The public can scarcely conceive the immense amount of 
injury, both to the country and the private soldier, that is 
due to the ignorance of officers. 

Above all, no political influences should be brought to bear to 
control or neutralize the action of these boards. Such influ- 
ences have already done our military affairs a vast deal of 
mischief and crowded our armies with incompetent officers. 
If politics should control the business, then the whole of 
this proposed plan would do us harm on a gigantic scale, 
and no one would be more violently opposed to its adoption 
than the writer of this article. 



24 

All the details of the plan herein proposed for increasing 
the regular army may not he found entirely practicable , or 
free from valid objections, but the main object of the writer 
has been to shew the necessity for such an increase, and for 
the exercise of a cautious discrimination in the selection of 
officers. If the writer will have succeeded in awakening 
interest in the subject, in turning the thoughts of some re- 
flecting minds in what he conceives to be the right direc- 
tion, in exposing some popular humbugs which lie in the 
path of reform, and in showing that the sneers against a 
worthy institution are founded in "buncombe," and not in 
justice, he will be fully satisfied. That we may profit by 
the experience of the past — that all conservative men may 
unite in crushing out the demagogism, factions and here- 
sies which have been so long sapping the dignity and power 
of the Federal Government, and that its flag may be borne 
triumphantly over every portion of the Kepublic, is his 
earnest hope. 

In conclusion, he has only to say that this paper has been 
written hurriedly by one engrossed in the cares of professional 
pursuits, and who has cared more about what he had to say 
than how he said it. 

FEDEKALIST. 




LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



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